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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiciton in this matter pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(i) of theUtah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court's formula for determining the equitable division of the 
parties interest in the real property in question, based on the evidence provided 
to the court at trial, a misapplication of the law as Appellant claims. 
The standard of appellate review is correction of error, Orton v. Carter, 
970 P.2d 1254, (Utah 1998) and breadth of judicial discretion of trial court 
judges. 
2. When the value of the real property in question and equitably dividing up 
interests in that real proprety was pled for and on notice to both parties that it 
would be an issue at trial, can the Appellant rightfully complain abuse of 
discretion by the judge for using one of the alternative valuations available to it 
from the trial to determine equity, and when the fault for not having Appellant's 
preferred valuation in evidence for the court to determine value was the sole 
fault of Appellant. 
The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion, Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
1 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint filed on or about September 29, 1999, sought 
the Court's determination of the parties7 interest in a residence upon real 
property on three separate bases: (a) dissolution of partnership and determination 
of equitable partnership shares; (b) quiet title on the basis of adverse possession; 
and (c) that defendant had no interest in said property and her name was on the 
Deed solely as an accommodation to plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleged in their 
complaint that Plaintiff had sole use of the property for many years, that 
Defendant had abandoned her interest in the property and had failed to 
contribute in any meaningful way to the purchase, maintenance or upkeep of the 
property. (Record at pages 1-6) (the copy of Plaintiffs complaint attached to 
the brief received by counsel from Appellant was missing page 3. Therefore, 
the full complaint is attached hereto). 
2. Defendant answered, admitted that the parteis were in a partnership 
with respect to the real property, and denied all other allegations, and requested 
the Court to order the property sold and the equity divided equally between the 
parties. (Record at pages 7-8). 
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3. A trial on the issues was held on June 6, 2000, and the Court 
entered Findings, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order Quiteting Title 
in Plaintiff Dan Lee July 31, 2000. (Record at pages 52-56 and unnumbered 
attachment to Appellant's brief of Findings and Judgment). 
4. Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Judgment August 9, 2000, 
which was objected to in writing by Plaintiff. (See attachment to Appellant's 
brief and attachment of Plaintiffs response and objection attached to Appellee's 
brief). 
5. The Court issued an Order on Defendant's Motion denying the same 
October 12, 2000. (See attachment to Appellant's brief). 
6. Defendant filed her Notice of Appeal October 19, 2000, from a 
final Order entered in the Fourth District Court, Utah County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
a. Plaintiff and defendant began living together in August of 1993 and 
lived together until October of 1996, at which time they separated. (Findings, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quiteting Title, paragraph 1). 
b. At first the parties lived with plaintiffs mother, but then in 
September of 1994, plaintiff and defendant signed as borrower and co-borrower 
for the purchase of the home located in American Fork, Utah, and lived together 
in this home until their separation. (Findings, J and OQT, paragraph 1). 
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c. Plaintiff had intended on purchasing this home in his own name but 
couldn't qualify for a loan (even though he was working at the time) because of 
a recent layoff. Plaintiff therefore asked Defendant to co-sign which she did but 
Plaintiff had to pay off some of her debts so she could qualify. The total 
down payment of over $7,000.00 came from Plaintiff funds solely. (Record at 
pages 68-69). 
d. The parties did not hold themselves out as husband and wife. 
(Findings of Fact, J and OQT, paragraph 1). 
e. The parties signed documents indicating a joint tenancy status 
though always holding themselves out as unmarried, at all times. Plaintiff had 
a poor education and did not even understand what a trust deed was or what 
joint tenancy meant and that he felt she was signing just to help him and didn't 
comprehend she was obtaining an interest in his property.. (Record at pages 69-
72). 
f. The total purchase price for the property was $58,395.26 and $6,995.26 
was paid as a down payment leaving a total balance due of $51,296.7. None of 
the down payment was paid by Defendant Dora. (Record at pages 55-56 and 
Findings, J and OQT, paragraph 2). 
g. Though disputed, the court found in it's Findings that during the two 
year period the parties were together in this home they pooled their incomes 
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during the time that each was employed for the benefit of the each other, and 
paying the monthly mortgage on the home, either from funds contained in a 
joint bank account or from Defendant's separate bank account. (Findings and J 
and OQT, paragraph 3). 
h. Though a little home, plaintiff testified he did almost all the repairs 
and rennovations himself and paid for materials with his money and with little 
or any help from Defendant. (Record at pages 79-85). Defendant disputed this. 
i. The Court found that regardless of what labels are put on the theory 
of recovery, as claimed in this case by the Parties, i.e., contract, partnership or 
quasi-marital relationship, the court finds that the Plaitniff and Defendant for 
purposes of purchasing the property in question held themselves out as joint 
tenants purchasing the property together, (unnumbered pages Findings, 
Judgment, OQT, paragraph 4). 
j . After payment of the down payment by Plaintiff, the beginning 
balance of the amount due for the purchase of the property was $51,296.75. 
That the balance due on the mortgage when Defendant left was $50,135.78. 
That the difference between the purchase price and the price at the time 
Defendant left is the equity established by payments made. That neither party 
put on any evidence for the Court to consider with respect to appreciation in 
value of the property fromthe time of purchase to October 31, 1996, the time of 
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separation, nor from the time of purchasse to the time of trial, (unnumbered 
page, Findings, Judgment and OQT, paragraph 5). 
k. Defendant attempted at trial to introduce an appraisal at trial but could 
not overcome a hearsay objection having not bothered to subpoena any relevant 
witnesses who could testify and be cross-examined, and no appraisal was 
therefore received by the court. (Record at pages 51-53). 
1. The Court found that the only way the Court had of determining any 
equity in the property that is subject to distribution is to determine the purchase 
price and compare it to the balance due on a specific date, namely the 
separation of the parties, (unnumbered page, Findings, Judgment and OQT, 
paragraph 6, and Exhibits 23 and 16). 
m. The Court found that after the time of separation, Plaintiff continued 
to reside in the home and pay the monthly mortgage payments, taxes and 
insurance. No moneys were paid by the Defendant from October 31,1996 to the 
time of trial, (unnumbered page, Findings, Judgment and OQT, paragraph 7). 
n. The Court found that considering the evidence, and based upon the 
principles of equity (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-2-6 (1999), and partnership, the 
Parties, though unmarried (UCA SEc. 30-1-4.5), should share equally in the 
amount of equity found by the Court. Therefore, the Court divided the 
$1,160.97 found in mortgage reduction as set forth in Fact j above equally 
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between the parties, (unnumbered page, Findings, Judgment and OQT, 
paragraph 9). 
0. The equity established in the property by evidence is $1,160.97, and 
defendant is entitled to $580.48 plus interest as her equity in the property, 
(unnumbered page, Findings, Judgment and OQT, paragraph 8-10). 
p. The Court quieted title to the property in Plaintiffs name against the 
Defendant, (unnumbered page, Findings, Judgment and OQT, paragraph 11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. That it was not improper in any way for the trial court to determine the 
amount of the home's equity using the evidence placed before him and by the 
means he used of reduction of mortgage, inasmuch as, contrary to Appellant's 
assertions, the trial court ruled that the "value of the real property and it's 
equity were pled by both parties", and evidence was presented to give the court 
a basis for their ruling. 
2. That dividing up a partnership, and making an equitable division of 
the same are, obviously, equitable issues for which the trial court has a broad 
discretion, after listening to the testimony and taking evidence, to fashion an 
equitable remedy. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THAT IT WAS NOT IMPROPER IN ANY WAY FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE HOME'S EQUITY USING THE EVIDENCE PLACED 
BEFORE HIM AND BY THE MEANS HE USED OF REDUCTION OF MORTGAGE, 
INASMUCH AS, CONTRARY TO APPELLANT'S ASSERTIONS, THE TRIAL COURT 
RULED THAT THE "VALUE OF THE REAL PROPERTY AND IT'S EQUITY WERE PLED" 
BY BOTH PARTIES, AND EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO GIVE THE COURT A BASIS 
FOR IT'S RULING. 
APPELLANT relies in her argument on the assertion that it was improper 
for the trial judge to determine equity because it was not pled or on notice to 
the parties. The trial judge, however, in his Order on Appellant's Motion to 
Amend the Judgment made a specific finding that the matter of equity and the 
value of the equity in the home was pled and at issue and that the parties were 
on notice as to the same. "Both the Plaintiffs Complaint and Defendant's 
Answer put at issue the value of the real property at issue in the lawsuit. Thus, 
both parties were on notice by reason of the pleadings that the value of the real 
property and its' equity would be questions to be addressed at the time of trial. 
Based upon the evidence presented by the parties at trial, a determination was 
made by the Court as to equity as stated in the Court's Findings of Fact. 
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Therefore, in accordance with that evidence, the Court's determination was 
proper and equitable. . ." . (See Order on Appellant's Motion dated 12 
October, 2000, attached to Appellant's brief, and copy of Answer of Defendant 
attached to Appellant's brief and full copy of Plaintiffs complaint attached 
hereto to Appellee's brief.) 
While the trial judge in his Findings makes the statement that "neither 
party presented any evidence of appreciation in value of the property. . ." the 
record reveals that Plaintiff/Appellee in fact presented two pieces of evidence 
that gave the court two valid ways of determining equity and in fact the trial 
court used one of them.. The first, as acknowledged in Appellants brief was a 
county valuation notice for 1999, Exhibit 12 showing a value in 1999 of $80, 
157.00. The second were Exhibits 23 and 16 referred to in the trial court's 
Findings (para. 5), which showed the beginning balance on the mortgage and 
the payments made till time of separation and the balance at time of separation. 
The trial court also in it's Order of denial of Defendant's Motion to Amend 
stated that it was aware of other alternative valuation approaches but felt uner 
the circumstances and with the evidence before it that the reduction of mortgage 
method was best. Therefore the trial court had several alternative in mind, 
and had at least two viable items of competent evidence upon which to place a 
valuation of the equity in the property. The trial judge chose to use the 
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evidence presented as to mortgage payments made and reduction in mortgage 
amount and found it the most equitable means of determining the fair 
partnership interest of the parties in the property based on their equitable 
contributions. (Order on Defendant's Motion, para. 1, attached to Appellant's 
brief). 
We have here a case where, contrary to Appellant's assertions, the issue of 
valuation and equity was pled by both parties (according to the trial court's 
findingds in the Order On Defendant's Motion, para. 2), and at issue and on 
notice to both parties. Where Plaintiff was the only one that gave the court any 
basis upon which to make a ruling and whereby the court chose the mortgage 
payments valuation method urged by Plaintiff. Contrary to Appellants 
assertion that they were not on notice as to valuation issues, the record reveals 
that Appellant attempted to put in evidence an alleged appraisal from the time 
shortly after Appellant left the home. Appellant failed to subpoena any 
witnesses to testify about the appraisal and to be cross examined on the same 
and justifiably failed to overcome a hearsay objection as to the appraisal. 
(Record at pages 51 and 52). Because, of this error, Appellant sought by way 
of Motion to Amend to get a second bite at the apple which was denied and has 
now appealed seeking yet another opportunity. The trial court can only 
proceed on evidence before it and Appellant should have to bear the results of 
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a failure to adequately present their case when the opportunity was given and 
they were on notice. 
SINCE the matters of equity distribution and valuation were pled and the 
parties were on notice of the same, the trial court had every right to determine 
equity and did not do so improperly, and its decision should not be disturbed. 
n. THAT DIVIDING UP A PARTNERSHIP, AND MAKING AN EQUITABLE 
DIVISION OF THE SAME ARE, OBVIOUSLY, EQUITABLE ISSUES FOR WHICH THE TRIAL 
COURT HAS A BROAD DISCRETION, AFTER LISTENING TO THE TESTIMONY AND 
TAKING EVIDENCE, TO FASHION AN 
EQUITABLE REMEDY. 
Defendant/Appellant cites the Berger case (Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 
695, 699 (Utah 1985)), for the proposition that a trial judge who uses 
inconclusive or improper evidence to determine value may be corrected on 
appeal. The re-valuation Appellant speaks of in the Berger case actually was 
related to stock valuations and had nothing to do with real property. That same 
case does however deal with real property valuations at a different point where 
the court said, ''The defendant further contends that certain pieces of real 
property which were awarded to the plaintiff were undervalued. We have 
examined these valuations and refrain from disturbing any of them since all 
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were based on competent evidence. Their value was in issue at the trial, and the 
court, within its' rightful discretion, and in each instance adopted the valuation 
urged by the plantiff." (Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 699 (Utah 1985)). 
Appellant has set forth no evidence that the valuations and valuation 
methods before the court were either inconclusive, improper or inadmissible. 
They were properly before the court as set forth above and the trial judge had 
every right, if he felt it was in the interest of equity overall to use them as a 
means of dividing up the interests of the parties. 
It should be kept in mind, that the trial court is generally given great 
discretion in property division cases. (Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 
(Utah, 1985); Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, Utah App., 1993) Also note 
Lafavi v. Bertoch, 994 P2d. 817, Utah App (2000), where the proposition is 
supported that the same equitable powers of the divorce court to determine the 
equitable interests of parties to assets in a divorce is also within the discretion 
of trial judges in equitably dividing partnership interests, and that the trial court 
has a presumption of validitiy. "When a reasonable basis exists for the trial 
court's award of damages, this court will affirm the damage award on appeal. 
See Gillmorv. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah CtApp.1987), c e r t , d e n i e d , 765 R2d 1278 
fUtah 1988^ s e e a l s o Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877. 882 (Utah Ct.App.1995) 
(explaining that trial court's actions regarding valuation of 
property interests entitled to presumption of validity)." Lafavi 
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v. Bertoch. The trial court is in the best position to weigh 
all the testimony and to determine what is, overall, the most 
equitable result and division of property. 
In this case the trial court heard the disputed testimony 
about who performed and paid for the majority of the improvements 
to the property; about how Appellee paid the entire down payment 
from his proceeds (Record at page 11); disputed testimony on 
the relative incomes of the parties and contributions to the 
home, and on their intentions relative to who really owned the 
property and what Appellee's intentions were in having Appellant 
sign on the property with her; and how Appellant abandoned the 
relationship after only being in the home 2 years. (Record at 
page 71). 
The judge heard all the testimony as set forth in the record 
and weighed it accordingly, and then, on the basis of competent 
evidence before it, made a decision as to the valuation and the 
equitable division thereof that the trial court felt served the 
ends of justice and equity. Appellant has provided no valid 
reasons or reasoning why this decision of the trial court should 
be disturbed and the same should be sustained by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not improperly apply the law or abuse 
it's discretion in any way by dividing up the equitable interests 
of the parties in the home as it did. After hearing all 
evidence and testimony, the court has broad discretion in 
fashioning a remedy and the method chosen by the trial court is 
13 
based on competent evidence and is not error or abuse of 
discretion. The trial courts decision should be left 
undisturbed and affirmed. 
DATED this ^ j T day of June, 2001. 
Ralph C. Amott, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mailing Certificate 
I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage prepaid, this.^^ day of June, 2001 to the 
following: 
Howard Chuntz 
Attorney for Defendant 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 ^ . _, , 
/ 
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RALPH C. AMOTT, (#0068) 
DONALD D. GILBERT (#6733) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 E 100 So., STE 102 
PROVO UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-6575 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 NORTH 100 WEST, PROVO, UTAH 84601 
DAN F. LEE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN, ] 
and John Does 1-10, ] 
Defendants. ] 
i COMPLAINT 
i Civil No.99- £)</^ OJW Z % 
COMES NOW plaintiff and complains of Defendants, and for cause 
of action alleges as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Equitable dissolution and division of partnership property 
and/or judgment for contribution and payments of Plaintiff) 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Utah County, 
State of Utah. 
2. That the property that is the subject of this lawsuit is 
located in the City of American Fork, County of Utah, State of Utah 
and is more particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING 132.0 FEET WEST OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
BLOCK 10, PLAT A, OF THE AMERICAN FORK CITY SURVEY OF 
BUILDING LOTS; THENCE NORTH 107.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 95.5 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 25.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 20.0 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 132.0 FEET TO THE NORTH LINE OF 100 SOUTH STREET; 
THENCE EAST 115.5 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
AREA: 0.30 ACRES. 
3. In 1994, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a 
partnership by becoming record owners of the subject property 
described above as unmarried individuals. 
4. Plaintiff and Defendant cohabitated at the subject 
property from 1994 to November 1996. 
5. In November 1996, Defendant abandoned Plaintiff and the 
property, left the state for a period of time, and married, having 
no further contact with Plaintiff or the property. 
6. That Plaintiff has been paying the taxes, mortgage 
payments, costs of repair, maintenance and has made improvements on 
the subject property for each and every year since the acquisition 
in 1994 and resides there today. 
7. At no time since the acquisition in 1994 has Defendant 
made any contributions, or only nominal ones, towards payment of 
the mortgage, costs of repair, maintenance, improvements, insurance 
or taxes on the subject property. 
8. That Defendant has breached the partnership agreement by 
abandoning the premises and by failing to make contribution or 
reimbursing for the same and the partnership should therefore be 
dissolved and the property distributed to Plaintiff in its 
entirety. 
9. That Plaintiff has sought to refinance the subject 
property but Defendant's name on the property is a cloud thereon 
preventing refinance or sale and Defendant has refused and ignored 
requests to remove her name or assign over title or even to make an 
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equitable distribution of equity in the property based on fair 
contribution ratios of the parties to the partnership. 
10. That Plaintiff seeks and is entitled to an order of this 
court dissolving the partnerhsip of the parties, to an accounting 
and determination of all partnership proceeds and contributions, 
and to an order determining the relative equitable value of each 
parties contribution to the investment property, which Plaintiff 
believes should be a finding of 100% interest in the property to 
Plaintiff and 0% to Defendant. 
11. Plaintiff is also entitled to have an order of this court 
removing Defendants name from the property and awarding free and 
clear title to him, or in the alternative granting Plaintiff a 
judgment against Defendant for all contributions, payments, 
improvements and such as he has made on this property, all as may 
be proven at trial. 
12. Plaintiff reserves the right to identify the John Does, 
if any, listed above who have or may claim an interest in this 
property due to encumbrances placed thereon by Defendant, if any, 
of which Plaintiff is not aware, and Plaintiff asserts his interest 
in the subject property herein to be superior to all other 
interests of Defendant or any John Does to be hereafter identified. 
13. Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of costs and 
attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this action 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(QUIET TITLE) 
14. Plaintiff realleges all prior allegations set forth 
herein. 
3 
15• Plaintiff has had actual, continuous possession and made 
open, exclusive and notorious use of the property for the last 
three (3) years. Said use has been under claim of right and/or 
title, adverse and hostile to any interest that Defendant may 
assert in the property. 
16. That based on Plaintiff's sole use of the property for 
many years, and Defendant's abandonment thereof, and her failure to 
contribute in any meaningful way to the purchase, maintenance, or 
upkeep of the property in question, and the fact that this is, and 
always was, simply what the parties considered a partnership or 
investment based on relative contribution to the purchase and 
upkeep of the property, and based on all other allegations 
heretofore set forth, that Plaintiff is entitled to an order 
Quieting Title to said property in Plaintiff, free and clear of any 
interest or claim of Defendant or any other person. 
17. That Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this quiet title 
action. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(ACCOMODATION) 
18. Plaintiff realleges all prior allegations set forth 
herein. 
19. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges that the taking of 
this property in Defendant's name jointly with Plaintiff, was done 
solely as an accomodation to Plaintiff by Defendant. 
20. That defendant knew, or should have known, that she 
claimed no interest in this property and that her subsequent 
behavior after taking title jointly with Plaintiff attests to this 
understanding in that she made no contribution to the mortgage, 
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improvements, taxes or any other aspect of maintaining this home, 
that she abandoned the same after only a short time and has 
continuously abandoned it for many years. 
21. That equitably Plaintiff is entitled to all equity that 
has accrued in this home since its purchase based on his sole 
contributions thereto, and the fact that Defendant's taking joint 
title with him was a mere accomodation and intended by the parties 
to endow no interest or claim on the property in Defendant. 
22. That Plaintiff is entitled therefore to an order removing 
Defendant's name from this property and awarding it free and clear 
to Plaintiff, plus an award of costs and fees in incurred in 
prosecuting this action. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant 
Branin, and all other John Does as may be identified and added 
hereafter, as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 
1. For an order of this court dissolving the partnerhsip of 
the parties, to an accounting and determination of all partnership 
proceeds and contributions, and to an order determining the 
relative equitable value of each parties contribution to the 
investment property, which Plaintiff believes should be a finding 
of 100% interest in the property to Plaintiff and 0% to Defendant. 
2. For an order of this court removing Defendant's name from 
the property and awarding free and clear title to him, or in the 
alternative granting Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant for all 
contributions, payments, improvements and such as he has made on 
this property, all as may be proven at trial. 
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3. For an order that Defendant, and all persons or John Does 
claiming interest with Defendant, have no estate, right, title, 
lien or interest in or to the property or any part thereof, and 
Plaintiff's interest is superior to all others, 
4. For an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in 
prosecuting this action 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: 
1. For an Order of this Court quieting title to the subject 
property in Plaintiff solely, 
2. For an order that Defendant, and all persons or John Does 
claiming interest with Defendant, have no estate, right, title, 
lien or interest in or to the property or any part thereof, and 
Plaintiff's interest is superior to all others. 
3. For an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in 
prosecuting this action 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: 
1. For an Order of this court that Plaintiff is entitled to 
an order removing Defendant's name from this property as being 
solely an accomodation signer, and awarding it free and clear to 
Plaintiff, plus an award of costs and fees in incurred in 
prosecuting this action. 
DATED this ^ day of September, 1999 
Ralph Amott, 
Donald D. Gilbert, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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RALPH C. AMOTT (#68) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 377-6575 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 NORTH 100 WEST, PROVO, UTAH 64601 
DAN F. LEE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN, ] 
and John Does 1-10, ] 
Defendants. 
> OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
> MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
) AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
I AND AUTHORITIES 
) Civil No.9904-03528 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through his attorneyfs 
undersigned, and objects to that Motion to Amend Judgment filed 
by Defendant in this matter on the following grounds and for the 
following reasons: 
MEMORANDUM 
Defendant's Motion to Amend filed herein is defective both 
procedurally and sustantively and should be denied. Following 
are the grounds and basis for this conclusion: 
Procedural Defects: 
1. Defendant has brought this motion under Rule 59(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 59e deals with altering 
or amending judgments and is vague in it's application at best. 
On it's face it would seem to apply more to correction of obvious 
mistakes such as correction of figures improperly typed or 
listed, correction of sentences that are unclear or non-sensical, 
correction of contradictory references that either are not what 
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the court stated or make unclear what the court stated; or other 
obvious errors. There is even case law supporting the 
proposition that this vague 59e is in actuality only a 
restatement of the time limit for 59a New Trial motions and must 
contain allegations that fall within the categories listed above 
for 59a motions. In Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray, 590 
P2d 309, at page 311 the court stated: 
"Subdivision (e) of Rule 59 provides a time limitation for 
this type of motion, which is directed to the Court for rehearing 
of it's own judgment. Such motions must be based on one or more 
of the grounds set forth in subdivision (a)." (Utah 1979). 
A careful reading of the memorandum of Defendant, and 
especially tha first two paragraphs, makes it clear that what 
Defendant is actually doing is either objecting to the proposed 
Findings and Conclusions of Law and Judgment; or she is 
requesting a new trial which should have been brought under rule 
59a. 
a. If this is more properly construed as an objection to 
proposed Findings and Judgment then Defendant's motion is 
untimely. After the Courtfs Ruling in this matter was received 
in early July, Counsel undersigned prepared the proposed 
Findings, Consclusions and Judgment as ordered and mailed them to 
Counsel Chuntz for the Defendant on July 7, 2000, as the mailing 
certificate indicates. Within the 8 days (5+3) allowed for 
objection under the Rules of Judicial Administration (4-504(2)), 
Defendant Chuntz failed to respond with an objection or to sign 
off on the proposed judgment "Approved as to Form". The 
judgment was therefore filed with the court around July 21 and 
the Court sigrxed and entered the Judgment July 31. 
By failing to timely object to the proposed findings 
and judgment, Defendant has lost their right to object to the 
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same and Defendant is trying to extend this cut-off time by 
questionable use of Rule 59e. 
b. If this motion is more properly construed as a request 
for New Trial than it fails as well because none of the 
requirements under Rule 59a have been met or even alleged by 
Defendant. They have not alleged (a) irregularity of the 
proceedings, (b) misconduct of jury-or court, (c) accident or 
suprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, 
(d) newly discovered evidence, (e) excessive or inadequate 
damages appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice, (f) insufficiency of evidence to justify 
the verdict or that it is against law, and (g) error in law. 
None of these factors apply in this case and none were alleged by 
Defendant. 
In addition 59a is subject to the over-riding considerations 
of Rule 61 which states: 
ftNo error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action is to appear inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The Court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the pro-
ceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties.ff 
The arguments of Defendant in her memorandum reveal or 
allege no basis under rule 59a or rule 61 that would require or 
even justify this court in granting a new trial or allowing new 
evidence. No error in leasoning of the court or of factual 
findings set forth has been alleged other than Defendant's 
feeling that the court should have heard evidence on value of the 
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property at the time Defendant left in 1996. The fact is that 
the court did nothing to preclude any such evidence if Defendant 
had sought to bring it up. They did make an effort at one point 
to bring in an appraisal but when it was objected to as hearsay, 
which it obviously was, no further effort to establish value was 
made. Defendant coula have supboenaed the appraiser to make his 
appraisal non-hearsay and to allow for cross-examination, but she 
did not do so, at her own risk. A fair reading of Defendant's 
Memorandum makes it clear that what they are asking for in fact 
is a new trial and the opportunity to present new evidence. They 
are seeking a second bite of the apple and asking for things that 
would most definitely require a new trial and the presenting of 
new evidence and the counter-arguing of the same by Plaintiff. 
It appears that Defendant, knowing she had no good case for 
requesting a New Trial, has tried to boot strap this matter with 
an appeal to the more vague Rule 59e, which in any event should 
not apply either. 
c. Finally, procedurally, this motion of Defendant may seek 
to be construed as a Motion to Reconsider. Although there is no 
provision in the Rules for a Motion to Reconsider, the case law 
seems to support the position and states that a judge certainly 
has the right to reconrider any ruling or decision he has made 
BEFORE IT IS REDUCED 1^ A FINAL ORDER OR JUDGMENT. (Ron Shepherd 
Ins. vs. Shields, 882 P.2nd 650, p.654). 
This period between ruling and final order is not unfairly 
short in this matter due to Defendants counsel's own actions of 
failing to sign off or object to the proposed judgment. At least 
a month or more passed from Ruling to final entry of judgment. 
BASED on the foregoing procedural defects, Plaintiff would 
request that Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment be denied. 
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Substantive defects: 
2. The essence of Defendants argument appears to be that 
the court erred in deciding that the best means of determining 
equity with the facts before it was to determine the amount of 
mortgage reduction ana oplit that value between the parties. 
Defendant suggests that the court overlooked or made a mistake in 
not seeing the obvious need to establish a value on the home as 
of 1996 (or 2000, it is unclear in defendant's motion), to 
determine what, if any, equity increase there has been over and 
above the mortgage reduction. 
The logical defect in Defendant's reasoning however, is that 
it neglects the fact that the court is limited in it's ruling and 
decision making to the facts presented, and that it is the 
responsibility of the litigants to put forth the facts needed to 
prove and support their case, This is not the court's 
responsibility. As described above, only one effort by Defendant 
was made to present any evidence as to value and it was obvious 
hearsay and in improper form as testimony through no fault of 
Plaintiff or of the court. Nor was the need for further 
opportunity to put forth evidence on this point discussed or 
raised by Defendant at trial or during closing arguments. 
Contrary to the intimation of Defendant's motion, the Court 
did not overlook the difficultires of valuation, or simply forget 
them. Rather the court specifically discussed the difficulty of 
valuation based on the evidence place before it and addressed 
this problem in it's ruling and determined, based on the evidence 
before it, what the most logical and judicious manner of 
determining equity would be. 
In addition, Defendant's proposed new findings of having the 
property appraised and sold and the equity as it exists now 
divided between the parties, is simply harking back to her 
position in her answer and as taken at trial that somehow this is 
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a partnership with fiduciary responsibility on Plaintiff to hold 
the property for Defendant. It ignores the fact that the court 
has ruled on those issues, has determined that it should be 
equity as it stood in 1996 at the time of separation of the 
parties, and that equity must be determined based on the evidence 
before the court and only that evidence. Reading what defendant 
is requesting as an "amendment" to the judgment one wonders why 
we even had a trial. It is obvious they want to start over. 
In discussing Rule 60b, which is closely related to what 
Defendant is attempt^ i*g by citing rule 59e, (i.e. mistake, 
inadvertance, etc.), the Utah Supreme court said the following: 
" This rule brings into conflict competing interests in the 
finality of judgments and relief from inequitable judgments. A 
motion to modify a final judgment is addressed to the discretion 
of the trial court, the exercise of which must be based on sound 
legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances. The 
court's determination may be reversed only upon a showing that 
this discretion was abused. In addition to the conerns that 
final judmgnts should not be lightly disturbed and that unjust 
judgments should ot be allowed to stand, other factors the court 
should consider are whether rule 60(b) is being used as a 
substitute for appeal, whether the movant had a fair opportunity 
to make his objection at trial, and whether the motion was made 
within a reaonslbe time after entry of judgment." Laub v. South 
Central Utah Telephone, 657 P.2d 1304, at 1306 (Utah 1982). 
It is Plaintiff's position that the motion of Defendant is 
an improper substitute for appeal and fails in that it is utterly 
devoid of any sufficient reasoning or logic to show that this 
court abused it's discretion or that the pausity of any crucial 
evidence as may be ir support of Defendant's case was not 
Defendant's fault solely, and unobjected to at trial. 
IN CONCLUSION, based on the procedural defects in 
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Defendant's Motion, and based on the substantive failings of the 
position taken by Defendant's, Plaintiff would request that 
Defendant's motion be denied and that Plaintiff be awarded costs 
incurred in defending this motion in the amount of $250 if this 
matter is retolved without hearing or such other greater 
reasonable sum as the court may find appropriate if hearing is 
required. 
DATED this// day of August, 2000. 
Ralph C. Anu?€V 
Donald D. Gilbert 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Objection to Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment and Memorandum 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this /j^day of August, 2000, to 
Howard Chuntz, Attorney for Defendant, at 1149 West Center, Orem, 
Utah, 84057. 
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